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In this game, $q = 3/7$ means that Player 2 chooses their pure strategy Right (R) with a probability of $3/7$, and consequently chooses their pure strategy Left (L) with a probability of $4/7$. At this specific mixture, Player 1 is completely indifferent between choosing R and L, receiving an expected payoff of $12/7$ regardless of their choice.

Conditions: The game is the displayed 2x2 normal-form game.; Player 2 mixes between R and L with probabilities $q$ and $1-q$.; The equilibrium concept is mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

In this game, $q = 3/7$ means that Player 2 chooses their pure strategy Right (R) with a probability of $3/7$, and consequently chooses their pure strategy Left (L) with a probability of $4/7$. At this specific mixture, Player 1 is completely indifferent between choosing R and L, receiving an expected payoff of $12/7$ regardless of their choice.

Conditions: The game is the displayed 2x2 normal-form game.; Player 2 mixes between R and L with probabilities $q$ and $1-q$.; The equilibrium concept is mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.