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In this game, $q = 3/7$ means that Player 2 chooses their pure strategy Right (R) with a probability of $3/7$, and consequently chooses their pure strategy Left (L) with a probability of $4/7$. At this specific mixture, Player 1 is completely indifferent between choosing R and L, receiving an expected payoff of $12/7$ regardless of their choice.

Conditions: The game is the displayed 2x2 normal-form game.; Player 2 mixes between R and L with probabilities $q$ and $1-q$.; The equilibrium concept is mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

In this game, $q = 3/7$ means that Player 2 chooses their pure strategy Right (R) with a probability of $3/7$, and consequently chooses their pure strategy Left (L) with a probability of $4/7$. At this specific mixture, Player 1 is completely indifferent between choosing R and L, receiving an expected payoff of $12/7$ regardless of their choice.

Conditions: The game is the displayed 2x2 normal-form game.; Player 2 mixes between R and L with probabilities $q$ and $1-q$.; The equilibrium concept is mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

The expected payoff for a specific pure strategy is calculated by multiplying the payoffs of that strategy against each of the opponent's possible pure strategies by the probabilities of the opponent choosing those strategies, and then summing the results. It is the weighted average of the outcomes.

Conditions: The opponent has a set of pure strategies.; The opponent assigns a specific probability to each of their pure strategies, and these probabilities sum to 1.; The payoffs for the target player are known for each combination of pure strategies.

The expected payoff for a specific pure strategy is calculated by multiplying the payoffs of that strategy against each of the opponent's possible pure strategies by the probabilities of the opponent choosing those strategies, and then summing the results. It is the weighted average of the outcomes.

Conditions: The opponent has a set of pure strategies.; The opponent assigns a specific probability to each of their pure strategies, and these probabilities sum to 1.; The payoffs for the target player are known for each combination of pure strategies.