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When solving for Player 2's q, whose payoffs are made equal?

When solving for Player 2's mixing probability qq, Player 1's expected payoffs are made equal. Specifically, you equalize Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy R with Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy L. This is because Player 2's mixture must make Player 1 indifferent between their own actions in order for Player 1 to be willing to randomize.

Conditions

  • The context is finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
  • Player 2 is the one whose mixing probability qq is being solved for.
  • Player 1 is the opponent who must be made indifferent.

Reasoning, step by step

  1. Identify the player whose mixing probability is being solved for (Player 2).
  2. Identify the opponent (Player 1).
  3. Calculate the opponent's (Player 1's) expected payoff for each of their pure strategies.
  4. Set the opponent's expected payoffs equal to each other.
  5. Solve the equation for the mixing probability qq.

Example

To find qq, the board computes Π1(R)=3−3q\Pi_1(R) = 3 - 3q and Π1(L)=4q\Pi_1(L) = 4q, and then sets Π1(R)=Π1(L)\Pi_1(R) = \Pi_1(L) to get 3−3q=4q3 - 3q = 4q. Player 1's payoffs are equalized, not Player 2's.

Common misconceptions

  • A common error is to use Player 2's own payoffs when solving for Player 2's qq. The indifference principle requires making the *other* player indifferent.
  • Confusing which player's payoffs are used to solve for which player's mixing probability.

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