When solving for Player 2's mixing probability , Player 1's expected payoffs are made equal. Specifically, you equalize Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy R with Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy L.
Conditions: The context is finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.; Player 2 is the one whose mixing probability is being solved for.; Player 1 is the opponent who must be made indifferent.
When solving for Player 2's mixing probability , Player 1's expected payoffs are made equal. Specifically, you equalize Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy R with Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy L.
Conditions: The context is finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.; Player 2 is the one whose mixing probability is being solved for.; Player 1 is the opponent who must be made indifferent.