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When solving for Player 2's mixing probability $q$, Player 1's expected payoffs are made equal. Specifically, you equalize Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy R with Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy L.

Conditions: The context is finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.; Player 2 is the one whose mixing probability $q$ is being solved for.; Player 1 is the opponent who must be made indifferent.

When solving for Player 2's mixing probability $q$, Player 1's expected payoffs are made equal. Specifically, you equalize Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy R with Player 1's expected payoff from choosing their pure strategy L.

Conditions: The context is finding a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.; Player 2 is the one whose mixing probability $q$ is being solved for.; Player 1 is the opponent who must be made indifferent.